Research

Jing's research lies at the intersection of Computer Science (especially Theory of Computation) and Economics (especially Microeconomic Theory). She is particularly interested in the design of incentive mechanisms, which leverage information from self-interested parties so as to produce desirable outcomes for the decision maker. Her work focuses on designing resilient mechanisms that work properly even in "dirtier" or less foreseeable environments. This includes designing mechanisms that leverage the parties' imprecise or less structured information, even when they are not perfectly rational. This also includes designing mechanisms where the computation and communication cost of the involved parties are very low, mechanisms that protect the parties' privacy to the maximum extent possible, and mechanisms that work properly even when the parties can form coalitions and coordinate their strategies. Jing also works on the epistemic foundation of rationality, and the application of the theory of mechanism design to real-life scenarios, such as the design of healthcare policies. Finally, Jing is interested in all settings in Computer Science where interaction occurs among strategic parties, and the study and explanation of economic phenomenon in terms of the parties' computation power.