孔雨晴

姓  名:
孔雨晴
职  称:
新体制研究员(助理教授)
研究领域:
经济和理论计算
通信地址:
静园五院202-1
电子邮件:
yuqing.kong [at] pku.edu.cn

 

  孔雨晴,2013年于中国科学技术大学数学系获得学士学位,2018年于密歇根大学安娜堡分校计算机系获得博士学位,2018年9月入职北京大学信息科学技术学院,任前沿计算研究中心助理教授。

  

  Yuqing Kong is currently an assistant professor at the Center on Frontiers of Computing Studies (CFCS), Peking University. She obtained her Ph.D. degree from the Computer Science and Engineering Department at University of Michigan in 2018 and her bachelor degree in mathematics from University of Science and Technology of China in 2013.

  

  Her research interests lie in the intersection of theoretical computer science and the areas of economics: information elicitation, prediction markets, mechanism design, and the future applications of these areas to crowdsourcing and machine learning.

  

  理论计算机和经济方向交叉学科:将信息论,博弈论以及人工智能理论结合起来对同伴预测,预测市场,机制设计进行研究同时将它们应用在建立real-world 无监督信息收集处理平台上 (如建立去中心化的在线教育平台)以及机器学习领域(如计算机视觉,医疗图像分析)。

  

  The intersection of theoretical computer science and the areas of economics (EconCS):  information elicitation, prediction markets, mechanism design, and the future applications of these areas to crowdsourcing and machine learning.

 

Publications before joining CFCS

  • Y. Kong, G. Schoenebeck, "Eliciting Expertise without Verification," accepted by the 19th ACM Conference on Econ and Computation (EC), 2018.
  • Y. Kong, G. Schoenebeck, "Water from Two Rocks: Maximizing the Mutual Information," accepted by the 19th ACM Conference on Econ and Computation (EC), 2018.
  • Y. Kong, G. Schoenebeck, "Equilibrium Selection in Information Elicitation without Verification via Information Monotonicity," accepted by the 9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), 2018.
  • Y. Kong, G. Schoenebeck, "Optimizing Bayesian Information Revelation Strategy in Prediction Markets: the Alice Bob Alice Case," accepted by the 9th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), 2018.
  • Y. Kong, K. Ligett, G. Schoenebeck, "Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-telling Focal," accepted by the 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2016.

 

Manuscripts

  • Y. Kong, G. Schoenebeck, "A Framework For Designing Information Elicitation Mechanisms That Reward Truth-telling," in Arxiv, 2016, in journal submission (TEAC 2018).

 

Tutorial

  • "An Information Theoretic View of Information Elicitation Mechanisms," joint organize with Grant Schoenebeck, in the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2017.

coming soon!